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Abstract
With the launch of “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, China is injecting vitality into 
the ancient Silk Road. While China is seen to embrace it as the centrepiece of its 
economic strategy, the new Silk Road Initiative, if well implemented, is expected to 
bring forth the opportunity of economic prosperity for both China and the countries 
in the region. Against the backdrop of the complicated and volatile geopolitics in the 
mega-regions and the voracious needs for gigantic inputs of resources, etc., however, 
the operationality of the Initiative is in contrast with the grandiose discourse by the 
Chinese authorities. In particular, where China’s ultimate target is set to shape a new 
structure for global economic governance, its ability to lead vis-à-vis its targeted part-
ners’ readiness to cooperate, among others, remain to be tested. 
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1 One Belt One Road 
The “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century” 
are initiatives first introduced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in the fall of 2013 
during visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, respectively. 
The initiative consists of two main components, the land-based “Silk Road 
Economic Belt” (SREB) and oceangoing “Maritime Silk Road” (MSR). This 
modern-day Silk Road will bind together 65 countries and 4.4 billion people 
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from Xi’an in western China (the old imperial capital and the start of the origi-
nal Silk Road), across Central Asia to the Middle East, Russia and Europe. The 
maritime road is designed to link the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean, 
east Africa, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. 
To the surprise of many observers, the Chinese president’s initiative was, 
to his Kazakhstani host, possibly a reminder only of their shared commercial 
ties along the Silk Road, stretching back millennia. During a September 2013 
visit to Kazakhstan, which is later regarded as the place where this initiative 
sprouted, Xi Jinping spoke of the Silk Road, suggesting the long-time commer-
cial links between China and its neighbor. Xi went on to propose the establish-
ment of a Silk Road Economic Belt to bring new prosperity to Asia. The speech 
sounds a typical one on a diplomatic occasion and thus barely registered 
in the international media. It had even failed to attract adequate attention 
of the Chinese media, before Xi made a further reference of the Maritime Silk 
Road of the 21st Century in his Indonesia visit in October 2013. But less than 
two years later, when the National Development and Reform Commission, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce jointly promulgated 
the Action Plan for the so-called One Belt One Road Initiative on 28 March 
2015,1 the SREB/MSR strategy became a buzz word, and was formally made the 
centrepiece of China’s foreign policy and international economic strategy.2
2 Context
The sprout of the SREB/MSR strategy had its domestic economic background. 
China is in need of a new strategy to spur its sluggish economy. China had 
practiced, in the past three decades, the opening-up strategy which focused on 
manufacturing and exporting cheap goods. With the rise of labor costs, labor-
intensive goods are no longer competitive and labor-intensive industries move 
gradually to and aggregate in the neighboring countries. The old-fashioned 
opening-up strategy faces huge challenges. China is struggling to manage a dif-
ficult transition to a “new normal” of slower and more sustainable economic 
1   National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of 
Commerce, Vision and proposed actions outlined on jointly building Silk Road Economic Belt 
and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 28 March 2015.
2   George Magnus, China’s great economic journey takes it on to a new Silk Road, The Times, 
20 September 2015.
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growth.3 On the other hand, the overseas direct investment surged in the past 
decade, making China the third largest source of overseas direct investment 
(ODI) in the world in 2012,4 and a net exporter of capital in 2013.5 According 
to the Mistry of Commerce, China’s ODI, which involved 155 destination 
countries, reached US$118 billion in 2015 alone, marking an increase of 14.7% 
against the previous year.6 As China’s ODI stock reached a peak of more than 
US$1 trillion,7 China needs a new, safe, balanced and efficient opening-up 
strategy to boost its economy, and particularly to nurture a new round of eco-
nomic development.
The strategy needs to be understood against the background of the current 
world economy. In face of the weak recovery of the global economy in the 
post-crisis era, the developed economies are still in the process of revival and 
adjustment. With the weak market demands and rising protectionism, they 
are not in a position to continue importing goods from emerging economies in 
large scale, and unwilling to tolerate large trade deficits from the emerging 
economies. In the meantime, the developed economies and emerging econo-
mies vowed to work together to upgrade the current trading system, which is 
expected to serve as catalyst for the world economic development; only to find 
that each side blamed the reluctance of the other side for failing to cooper-
ate.8 Against this backdrop, the developed countries undertook, by their own, 
3   ‘New normal’, which is a popular term coined by President Xi during his May 2014 visit to 
Henan, a hinterland province, is referring to the current economic situation. According 
to Xi, the economy now features more sustainable, mid-to-high-speed growth with higher 
efficiency and lower cost, suggesting that the Chinese economy has entered a new phase that 
is different from the high-speed growth pattern exhibited in the past three decades.
4   See Ministry of Commerce, State Administration of Statistics, and State Administration of 
Foreign Exchanges, 2012 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 
available at http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/fec/201512/20151204085256581.pdf (last visited on 
30 April 2016).
5   See Ministry of Commerce, State Administration of Statistics, and State Administration of 
Foreign Exchanges, 2013 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment. 
An overview is available at http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tjsj/tjgb/201511/20151101190468 
.shtml (last visted on 30 April 2016).
6   http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tjsj/ydjm/jwtz/201601/20160101239832.shtml (last visited on 
30 April 2016).
7   http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ywzn/xgzx/guonei/201601/20160101237307.shtml (last visited 
on 30 April 2016).
8   After the failure of the negotiations under the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda in July 
2008, several countries blamed each other for the breakdown. The United States and some 
European Union members blamed India for the failure of the talks. India claimed that its 
position was supported by over 100 countries.
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to shape high standard, exclusive rules for global trade and investment. As a 
result, the free and open global trading system is at the risk of disintegration 
and thus undermining the competitive advantages that the emerging coun-
tries and other developing countries have enjoyed under the existing global 
trading system and reducing the global market and the sources of investment 
influx.
Up to 2013, fundamental changes have taken place with respect to the rela-
tionship between China and the rest of the world: China has risen to be the 
second largest economy in the world,9 the largest exporter and the second 
largest importer in goods,10 the third largest source of outbound foreign direct 
investment, and the owner of the largest foreign exchange reserve. The eco-
nomic power, its huge market potential, and its gigantic financial capacity lend 
China support in its economic relationship with the emerging economies: it 
can absorb the goods from the emerging economies in large scale, and pro-
vide needed capital to them, making it an irreplaceable market for their goods 
and an important source for the influx of capital in these countries. As one 
of the engine of the global economy, China has contributed substantially to 
the recovery of the world economy. According to the IMF, China contributed 
27.8% to the world economic growth in 2014, topping the world in contribu-
tion to the global economic growth.11 Some Chinese experts believe that China 
may raise “China Proposal” or “China Solution”, making it part of the “global 
solution”.12
Nowadays, the emerging countries are collectively a rising force in the 
global arena. In terms of the total economic output, they are comparable to 
the established powers, and the multi-polarization of the world economic pat-
tern becomes evident. Yet, the voice of the emerging economies is rarely heard 
in the discourse on global economic governance. The existing world economic 
structure and governance system were established under the US leadership, 
and thus dominated by the US and European economies. The IMF committed 
to undertake reform so as to divert some voting rights to the emerging econ-
omies. Due to the US reluctance, no accomplishment has been achieved as 
planned.
9    Since 2010, China has been the second largest economy after the United States.
10   See WTO Trade Database, available at http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountry 
PFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=CN.
11   IMF, World Economic Outlook 2014.
12   For example, see Gao Hucheng (Minister of Commerce), A Chinese Solution to the 
Promotion of Global Cooperation on Development, People’s Daily, 18 September 2015, p. 7.
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It is not difficult to see that in the past decade, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) fades in the new discourse of free trade, while the bilateral or multilat-
eral negotiation on free trade agreements (FTA) flourishes.13 Apparently, the 
accomplishment of freer trade calls for new platform and system.
As a matter of fact, within the existing system, emerging economies have 
difficulty expressing their wishes, and their role as a whole in global gover-
nance is disproportionate to their powers. Now that there is no room for fun-
damental reform, one may naturally turn to incremental reform. The New 
Development Bank, which comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa,14 is a result of such an endeavor. Unfortunately, the NDB fails to have 
the geo-economical support.
The SREB/MSR strategy is not intended to make a fresh start, but to integrate 
the existing multilateral and bilateral mechanisms into a broader framework.
3 Focus
One needs to turn to the Action Plan for a good understanding of the focus 
of the SREB/MSR. The Action Plan outlines five tasks to be accomplished: 
(1) Policy Coordination (2) Facility Connectivity (3) Unimpeded Trade 
(4) Financial Integration (5) People-to-People Bond. Needless to say, none 
of these tasks is easy to be completed. Policy coordination calls for frequent 
13   The United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam have just concluded the negotiation of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which sets forth high standard trade and investment 
rules for the Asia-Pacific region, and is supposed to deepen economic ties between these 
nations. For the text of the TPP, see https://ustr.gov/tpp/#text (last visited on 30 April 
2016). In the meantime, it is also negotiating with European Union the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which is aimed at setting forth high standard 
trade and investment rules for the cross-Atlantic region. It is anticipated that given the 
importance of the two pacts’ member economies in the world, when both the TPP and 
TTIP are completed, the US-led trading and investment rules will become really global 
rules. Some analysts have even suggested that the US may be trying to use the TPP as a 
means to undermine China’s growing economic might in the region, and isolate China 
with the new global rules.
14   On 14 July 2014, leaders of Brazil, China, India, Russia and India sealed on a deal in 
Fortaleza, Brazil for the founding of the New Development Bank. With each of the five 
signatories contributing $10 billion as its initial capital, the bank works on an equal-share 
voting basis. The NDB will have a president (an Indian for the first six years), a Board of 
Governors Chair (a Russian), a Board of Directors Chair (a Brazilian), and a headquarters 
(in Shanghai).
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diplomatic communications among the countries along the Silk Road with a 
view to promoting the mind meeting of the governments of these countries, 
Facility connectivity requires, among others, prioritizing the key projects 
along the Silk Road and first of all, gigantic inputs of resources by China, Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (ASIIB) and other countries, as well as private 
investors. Unimpeded trade and financial integration engender formidable 
work of institution-building among all the countries along the Silk Road, in 
the form of, for example, free trade agreement or international financial 
infrastructure. People-to-people bond requires intercourse and interaction 
between the peoples of all the countries along the Silk Road despite the cul-
tural disparity among them.
A close look at the Action Plan, however, will find that the roadmap is nota-
ble for its mixing of traditional Chinese diplomatic language (e.g., emphasiz-
ing sovereignty and non-intervention) alongside a newer rhetorical focus on 
adherence to high standards and international norms. Full of Chinese style 
language and rhetoric, the text of the Action Plan is not always comprehensi-
ble to outsiders. While using the poetic language to describe the Silk Road and 
calling for the revival and carrying-on of the spirit of the ancient trade routes, 
it fails to appease the worrisome link between the traditional tributary sys-
tem and the modern-day Silk Road. As the Action Plan is not a representation 
of China’s unilateral commitments, nothing therein can be suggested as joint 
commitments of the participating partners. Unfortunately, the Action Plan is 
full of such expressions as “we shall’ and “we should”, from the reiterated gov-
erning principles to suggested actions. Moreover, vague Chinese expressions 
and parallel constructions can be found, which adds difficulty to the interpre-
tation of the Action Plan.
Despite the difficulty that all this leave for the interpretation of the Action 
Plan, it is clear that the SREB/MSR strategy is a development strategy and 
framework which focuses on connectivity and cooperation among countries 
primarily in Eurasia. ‘Connectivity’ and ‘Cooperation’ are the key words of 
the SREB/MSR strategy, thus bringing forth the economic development of the 
Eurasia economies. 
Initially billed as a network of regional infrastructure projects, the latest 
release of the Action Plan indicates that the scope of the SREB/MSR strategy 
has expanded to establish a free trade network, to promote free flow of capital, 
technology, personnel as well as goods, to promote the effective interaction 
between the East Asia economic circle and the European economic circle, and 
now to include promotion of enhanced policy coordination across the Asian 
continent, financial integration, trade liberalization, and people-to-people 
connectivity. 
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Regarding connectivity, the SREB will on land, focus on jointly building a 
new Eurasian Land Bridge and developing China-Mongolia-Russia, China-
Central Asia-West Asia and China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridors by 
taking advantage of international transport routes, relying on core cities along 
the Belt and Road and using key economic industrial parks as cooperation plat-
forms. At sea, the Initiative will focus on jointly building smooth, secure and 
efficient transport routes connecting major seaports along the Belt and Road.15 
With respect to cooperation which is a guarantee to the smooth unfold-
ing and proper implementation of the SREB/MSR strategy, the Action Plan 
focuses on concerted work and move toward the objectives of mutual benefit 
and common security. To be specific, they need to improve the region’s infra-
structure, and put in place a secure and efficient network of land, sea and air 
passages, lifting their connectivity to a higher level; to further enhance trade 
and investment facilitation, establish a network of free trade areas that meet 
high standards, maintain closer economic ties, and deepen political trust; to 
enhance cultural exchanges; to encourage different civilizations to learn from 
each other and flourish together; and to promote mutual understanding, peace 
and friendship among people of all countries.
4 Institutions
Empirically, it is almost certain that without facilitating institutions, there 
would not be smooth integration among various countries with different eco-
nomic development levels, political structures and cultures; no ambitious plan 
like the SREB/MSR strategy can be properly implemented as planned. In light of 
the ambitious goal of the SREB/MSR strategy, a high standard FTA and an effi-
cient dispute settlement mechanism, among others, are needed. Unfortunately, 
the existing institutions across the Asian continent are fragmented. There are 
already such institutions as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ASEAN 
Plus China (10+1), etc.16 But none of these multilateral mechanisms is in a 
position to serve the SREB/MSR strategy well. Take as example the Shanghai 
15   Interestingly, given its close ties with neighboring countries in South Asia, the ongoing 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic 
Corridor are pronounced to be closely related to the Belt and Road Initiative.
16   Other institutions include Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Conference on Interaction and 
Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), China-Arab States Cooperation Forum 
(CASCF), China-Gulf Cooperation Council Strategic Dialogue, Greater Mekong Subregion 
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Cooperation Organization (SCO)17 along the SREC and a free trade agreement 
between China and the ASEAN18 (CAFTA)19 along the GMS. SCO was designed 
to be an organization facilitating cooperation among its members regarding 
primarily security issues. The economic integration among the SCO mem-
ber countries is slow and has borne no meaningful fruits,20 due to the fact 
that the members lack the incentive to promote an FTA among themselves. 
Russia, an important member of SCO, has its own competing scheme. It has 
formulated a Eurasia Economic Union (EEU) with Kazakhstan and Belarus.21 
Needless to say, Russia has no capacity and leadership if it has the intention to 
expand and transform the EEU into a FTA for the countries across the Eurasia. 
Moreover, there is no point expanding the SCO to the rest of countries along 
the SREB; neither is there possibility of transforming the SCO into an FTA 
for the countries along the SREC. 
So is the case with the CAFTA. It is a low standard FTA which has been far 
away from the forefront of FTAs. While the CAFTA used to be a focus for its 
“Early Harvest Package” that China offered to the ASEAN members, it lacks visi-
bility in the arena of FTAs—despite that both China and ASEAN are negotiating 
(GMS) Economic Cooperation, and Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation 
(CAREC).
17   SCO is a Eurasian political, economic and military organization which was founded in 
2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan. On July 10 2015, the SCO decided to admit India and Pakistan as full mem-
bers, and they are expected to join by 2016.
18   ASEAN stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, comprising Brunei, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Vietnam.
19   The framework agreement was signed on 4 November 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 
with the intention to establish a free trade area among the eleven nations by 2010. The free 
trade area came into effect on 1 January 2010. The ASEAN–China Free Trade Area is the 
largest free trade area in terms of population and third largest in terms of nominal GDP.
20   Trade volume between China and other SCO member states jumped from US$12.1 billion 
in 2001 to US$130 billion in 2013. Their economic output totaled 14.9 percent of the world 
economy, compared with just 4.8 percent in 2001. However, SCO mechanisms for eco-
nomic integration have so far ended up in such ones as the SCO Business Council and 
SCO Interbank Consortium.
21   EEU is an economic union of states located primarily in northern Eurasia. A treaty aim-
ing for the establishment of the EEU was signed on 29 May 2014 by the leaders of Belarus,  
Kazakhstan and Russia, and came into force on 1 January 2015. Treaties aiming for  
Armenia’s and Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union were signed on 
9 October 2014 and 23 December, respectively.
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an upgraded version.22 There is also no point expanding the CAFTA to the rest 
of the countries along the MSR.
In addition to the existing multilateral mechanisms, there are also estab-
lished international forums and exhibitions at regional and subregional levels 
hosted by countries along the Belt and Road, as well as a few platforms such 
as Bo’ao Forum for Asia.23 These forums are conducive to the visibility of the 
SREB/MSR strategy, but it is difficult for them to carry on the strategy. 
So is the case with various bilateral trade and investment agreements 
between the countries. China, for example, concluded trade and/or invest-
ment agreement with each country along the SREB/MSR. There is a network of 
such bilateral agreements of various natures, with various focuses and various 
degree of openness. 
Should one existing agreement be selected and expanded into the frame-
work agreement for all the countries along the SREB/MSR, or should a regional 
FTA be contemplated, strong leadership would be needed. No other country 
than China has such leadership. 
The core of the SREB/MSR strategy lies in the connectivity, of infrastructures 
in particular. The developing countries on the Eurasia lack in capital and tech-
nology. To meet the demands, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
was founded. Up to 57 countries have committed to join the AIIB, making it 
a real international development bank, serving the economic development 
of Asia. It is anticipated that the AIIB will bring together the Chinese money, 
European expertise and the demands of the Asia’s developing economies, and 
lay down the financial foundation for the implementation of the SREB/MSR 
strategy.
In this regard, no one can afford ignoring the role of a working dispute set-
tlement mechanism in the implementation of the SREB/MSR strategy. Varied 
 
 
22   China and the ASEAN members have set a goal to conclude the negotiations on upgrading 
the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement by the end of 2015.
23   Bo’ao Forum for Asia is a non-profit organisation that was initiated and supported by 
the Chinese government. It hosts high-level forums for leaders from government, busi-
ness and academia in Asia and other continents to share their vision on the most press-
ing issues in this dynamic region and the world at large. BFA is modeled after the World 
Economic Forum held annually in Davos, Switzerland. Other platforms include China-
ASEAN Expo, China-Eurasia Expo, Euro-Asia Economic Forum, China International Fair 
for Investment and Trade, China-South Asia Expo, China-Arab States Expo, Western 
China International Fair, China-Russia Expo, Qianhai Cooperation Forum, Silk Road 
(Dunhuang) International Culture Expo, Silk Road International Film Festival and Silk 
Road International Book Fair.
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interests or varied perceived interests, varied legal systems, varied cultures 
among the countries are likely to give rise to disputes, which in turn hamper 
the smooth implementation of the strategy. Designing and having in place a 
dispute settlement mechanism shall be given priority in all the agenda con-
cerning the SREB/MSR strategy.
5  Implications
Like the conclusion of the TPP, the release of this strategy attracted the eye of 
the world. Observers are mostly concerned with the objectives of SREB/MSR 
and its influence vis-à-vis those of the TPP. While China always highlights the 
economic output the plan will bring out, international observers focus more 
on China’s interests and the threats the strategy may cause rather than its eco-
nomic aspects. Some outside observers downplay the strategy as another sym-
bolism showing Beijing is trying to claim a place as Asia’s dominant economic 
and military power. It adds the annual Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
summit as a supporting example which “is set to endorse for the first time a 
“blueprint on regional connectivity” over the next decade.” A reference to the 
APEC is strongly suggesting that the SREB/MSR strategy is an unwieldy attempt 
and merely a declaration of grandiose goal.
TPP SREB/MSR
Agreement or 
initiative
A mega-regional trade 
agreement. 
An initiative rather 
than an agreement, 
involving no 
agreement.
Exclusive or open to a 
third party
US-led.
High membership 
requirements including 
rounds of negotiation 
special entry criteria rule 
out China’s participation 
at present.
Initiated by China. 
China is seeking 
support from countries 
along the Silk Roads 
open to any country 
The US is not involved 
and apparently does 
not plan to be. 
Economic links Should consolidate 
economic ties, especially 
with Japan and ASEAN 
countries. 
Will create a network 
of infrastructure (road, 
rail, ports, electricity, 
energy), trade and
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TPP SREB/MSR
For the US, expected to 
create job opportunities 
and increase exports to, 
and investment with, 
member countries.
finance connections 
between China and 
other countries. 
For China, 
providing an outlet 
for production 
overcapacity and 
overseas investment.
Economic and geopo-
litical influence
Expected to consolidate 
US Involving 12 
signatories accounting 
for more than 40 per 
cent of global GDP and a 
population of nearly 800 
million.
Power and market 
influence in Asia 
Pacific, especially Asian 
countries.
Aimed at making 
China the Involving 
some 65 countries, 
some 4.4 billion 
people, or 63 percent 
of global population
Economic powerhouse 
of the region. 
Seen as a strategy to 
lower the negative 
impact of TPP on 
China.
Rule-based or not Rule-based Unknown yet
Indeed, the SREB/MSR strategy is in contrast with the TPP. Unlike TPP, a high 
standard mega-regional free trade agreement, it is at its heart a pledge by China 
to use its economic resources and diplomatic skill to promote infrastructure 
investment and economic development that more closely links China to the 
rest of Asia and onward to Europe. In this regard, it seems to reflect China’s 
preference to avoid if possible formal treaties with measurable compliance 
requirements in favor of less formal arrangements that give it flexibility and 
allow it to maximize its economic and political skills, as well as recognition 
of the difficulty of building its Belt and Road. Indeed, the establishment of 
the Belt and the Road will not be an easy task. A great deal of deliberation 
and negotiation may be necessary among the countries along the Belt and 
the Road for generating necessary political interest in and support for these 
(cont.)
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mega-connectivity projects and viewing mutual benefits in them and for 
harmonization of customs & financial rules and regulations, removal/lowering 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers, trade and investment facilitation, etc, in order 
that desirable economic integration may be achieved. Negotiation at the bilat-
eral and multilateral levels has to be carefully planned and commenced on all 
these matters and areas.
A major issue would be building or development of appropriate infrastruc-
tural facilities in all the counties along the Belt and Road for the unfolding and 
smooth operation of the strategy. Many of the countries need financial 
and technical assistance in this regard. China might be required to provide a 
huge chunk of it. This will be a test of China’s capacity and willingness to chan-
nel formidable resources to the regional infrastructure development. An early 
commencement of the functioning of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank will be a major step forward in this arena. Even if enough resources can 
be made available to the infrastructures, there are also risks. For example, many 
of China’s past bilateral investment deals in Africa and Asia based around 
access to commodity resources were not commercially viable, poorly imple-
mented and, in some cases, unpopular locally.24 Improperly implemented, the 
SREB/MSR strategy would well end up as little more than a series of expensive 
boondoggles. 
Of course, it is premature to predict whether the SREB/MSR strategy is 
doomed to end in failure or will mark the start of a China era in global economic 
governance. But, it is instrumental to outline the problems and challenges fac-
ing the implementation of the strategy, and to explore the implications of the 
SREB/MSR strategy for China, if properly implemented, for the participating 
partners, and for the global governance separately. 
24   China Harbor Engineering Co. Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of state-owned China 
Communications Construction Co., was contracted by the Sri Lanka government to invest 
US$ 1.5 billion to build Colombo Port City. It would build berths for vessels at the nearby 
port, hotels, shopping centers, office buildings and residential complexes, covering a total 
area of more than 5.3 million square meters. The deal was to give the Chinese investors 
1.08 million square meters of land in the area, some of it outright and the rest on a 99-year 
lease. While the port project would have been the largest foreign direct investment Sri 
Lanka has received, the Chinese government held it dear as a pioneering project for the 
Maritime Silk Road strategy. However, the project spurred controversy in Sri Lanka, as 
some criticized it violated local laws and regulations and would damage the environment. 
Soon after the newly elected government came to office in March 2015, it announced its 
decision to hold off on the project while assessing its impact on the environment.
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 Implications for China
The SREB/MSR strategy is expected to feature prominently in China’s 13th Five-
Year Plan, which will run from 2016 to 2020 and guide national economic and 
social development strategy throughout that period. Its immediate implica-
tions are as follows:
The strategy will secure the transport of oil and gas and other essential 
goods, and particularly access to the Central Asian energy resources needed to 
sustain China’s economy. 
The property and investment boom at home has now ended, leaving China 
with significant overcapacity in industry and construction, deflation and rising 
debt management problems. The implementation of the strategy can ease the 
entry of Chinese goods into regional markets, help make use of China’s enor-
mous industrial overcapacity, thus offsetting the effects of a falling investment 
rate and rising overcapacity at home.
China has been tired of accumulating endless volumes of US Treasury and 
other government bonds, and now prefers more direct investment overseas to 
make a better use of its more than $4 trillion foreign exchange. Equally impor-
tant, the SREB/MSR can improve internal economic integration between the 
country’s advanced coastal and the more backward western provinces. These 
are the strategy’s intermediary implications. 
With respect to the long-term implications, by linking the economies of 
Central Asia with western China, China is expected to bring further develop-
ment and stability to restive and relatively underdeveloped Xinjiang and Tibet 
regions and cuts off any potential support that Uygur dissident groups may 
seek from fellow Muslims in Central Asia. With the unfolding of the SREB/MSR 
strategy, China will be in a position to promote the global use of RMB which is 
likely to lead to the internationalization of RMB.
 Implications for Partners
Needless to say, the SREB/MSR strategy will have its implications for the par-
ticipating countries along the Belt and Road. Properly implemented, the SREB/
MSR strategy will likely have an important effect on the region’s economic 
architecture—infrastructure development, patterns of regional trade and 
investment. However, this rests on their own perception of interests therein 
and the extent of cooperation they offered. It is not surprising if they argue 
SREB/MSR is too China-centric and that other participating states will reap 
only marginal benefits.
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 Implication for Global Governance
China has long expressed opposition to the dominance of the US and the dollar 
in the global financial institutions, most notably the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. 
The SREB/MSR strategy is the upgraded version of China’s grand strategy 
of opening-up, as well as China’s strategy for globalization. Globalization has 
been so far mainly driven by the West. With the unfolding of the SREB/MSR 
strategy, non-Western countries are going to inject vitality. The Chinese version 
of globalization needs to nurture shared interests, shared system and effective 
dispute settlement mechanism.
Another concern is that some Western officials also fear that a flood of 
Chinese development money will undermine governance standards at exist-
ing lending institutions like the World Bank, especially if China channels funds 
to its own companies, to politically motivated projects or to environmentally 
damaging ones. 
An even deep concern beneath, which results from the distaste for the 
Chinese governance structure and state-led economic structure, is whether 
China will extend and deepen its global footprint without fundamental 
changes in political and economic philosophy.
6 Concluding Remarks
The SREB/MSR strategy is an ambitious economic vision of the opening-up 
of and cooperation among the countries along the Belt and Road. It is aimed 
to establish a free and open market system in the heartland of Eurasia, and 
reshape the geo-economic order.
Inevitably, this will require China to project its growing power further. 
After all, this strategy would simply be a commercial but truculent riposte to 
America’s pivot to Asia. Important commercial consequences for the region 
and global companies will go hand-in-hand with unpredictable geopolitical 
implications in parts of the world where the US—and even Japan, India and 
Russia—has material and competing interests. In this context the operational-
ity of the strategy is in contrast with the grandiose discourse by the Chinese 
authorities.
